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In the post–Cold War era, two major trends illustrate the evolution of the 
international security environment: the spread of democracies and the emergence of 
asymmetric threats.  The former focuses on freedom, the latter on security.   
New democracies must pay close attention to fundamental values and norms that 
stand at their core, such as respect for human rights and civil liberties, rule of law, and 
civilian and democratic control.  At the same time, they need effective and efficient 
intelligence to fight the new threats.  Regulating intelligence activities is one of the 
greatest challenges of a democratic regime because there is a fundamental clash between 
the democratic culture, based on individual freedom, openness, transparency, 
accountability, and the secrecy and security-oriented intelligence culture. 
A fundamental question is raised:  How to democratize intelligence and maintain 
its efficiency and effectiveness at the same time?  The conundrum of intelligence reforms 
requires a trade-off between the need for good intelligence and the respect and promotion 
of democratic values.  This thesis analyses the impact of democratization on intelligence 
in four major areas: mandate, structure, control, and professionalization.  It studies the 
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The end of the Cold War did not mean the end of history.  The democratic peace 
theory proved to be partially true, in that democratic states did not fight each other. But 
the theory failed to explain or anticipate the new challenges to worldwide peace and 
security.  Despite democratic regimes flourishing throughout the world to an 
unprecedented number, different kind of risks, labeled “unconventional” or 
“asymmetric,” now threaten democracies around the world.  Especially after 9/11, 
terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and strategic crime1 emerged as 
top priorities to be addressed on the security agenda of democratic governments. 
These evolutions of the security environment inevitably lead to a transformation 
of those tools and mechanisms set up by states to counter the new threats.  This 
transformation is known as the security sector reform (SSR) and refers to changes made 
in the “state institutions and agencies that have the legitimate authority to use force, to 
order force, or to threaten the use of force,”2 namely the military, the intelligence 
agencies, and other institutions with responsibilities in this field (police and border troops 
as well as other paramilitary organizations such as the Gendarmerie).  SSR also concerns 
those governmental bodies that monitor and control the above-mentioned institutions 
(legislative, executive and judicial powers).  The aim of SSR is to increase the efficiency 
and effectiveness of the institutions with responsibilities in the security field.  At the 
same time, democratic regimes must pay close attention to fundamental values and norms 
that stand at their core, such as respect for human rights and civil liberties, rule of law, 
and civilian and democratic control. 
Within SSR, regulating intelligence is one of the greatest challenges in a 
democratic regime, because of its emphasis on secrecy. The process itself (collection, 
analysis, dissemination) is secret, the product of this process is also secret, and the 
                                                 
1 Defined here as transnational organized crime related to human, drug or arms trafficking. 
2 Hans Born and Philipp Fluri, “Oversight And Guidance: The Relevance Of Parliamentary Oversight 
For The Security Sector And Its Reform,” in Hans Born, Philipp Fluri and Anders Johnsson, eds. 
Handbook for Parliamentarians N°5, Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: Principles, 
Mechanisms and Practices, (Geneva: IPU/DCAF, 2003) 16. 
2 
organizations/individuals that carry out these tasks are often secret.  The reason for the 
cultural and structural contradiction between democratic values and intelligence is the 
need for secrecy in the latter.  “The basic conundrum for intelligence lies is its 
requirement for secrecy to be effective.  Intelligence services cannot disclose their 
activities to the public without disclosing them to their targets at the same time.  Their 
budgets are secret, their operations are secret, and both their products and their 
achievements are secret.”3  Moreover, secrecy and access to information unknown to 
others offer power (knowledge is power), but can sometimes lead to an inclination abuse 
of that power. 
Ensuring that intelligence activities are directed according to a set of rules, 
principles and laws inherent to a democratic system is a continuous process.  There is a 
fundamental clash between the democratic culture, based on individual freedom, 
openness, transparency, and accountability, and the secrecy and security-oriented 
intelligence culture.4  To put it simply, “Democracy and secrecy are incompatible.”5  The 
need to “respect fundamental norms integral to the effective functioning of an open 
society” situates itself in a troublesome relationship with the requirement of maintaining 
the operation of intelligence capabilities.6  On the other hand, intelligence is needed for 
informing policy, so that governments may better serve and protect the people.7  
Intelligence is “a permanent requirement for all states, no matter their form of 
government, because it enables a nation to anticipate and protect against threats to its 
basic security.”8  Moreover, “Intelligence services contribute to a democracy’s ability to 
                                                 
3 DCAF Intelligence Working Group, Intelligence Practice and Democratic Oversight–A 
Practitioner's View, DCAF, August 2003, 2, available at 
http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/Occasional_Papers/3.pdf (last accessed: March 03, 2006). 
4 William J. Lahneman, Problems of U.S. Intelligence Performance Prior to 9/11 and Attempts at 
Reform in a Democracy (Monterey: Proceedings from and international roundtable on intelligence and 
democracy, Center for Civil-Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School, August 2004), 1. 
5 Pat M. Holt, Secret Intelligence and Public Policy.  A Dilemma of Democracy (Washington DC: CQ 
Press 1995), 1. 
6 Peter Chalk and William Rosenau, Confronting the “Enemy Within” (Santa Monica: RAND 
Corporation 2004), 56. 
7 Loch Johnson, “Seven Sins of Strategic Intelligence,” in Loch Johnson, ed. America's Secret Power: 
The CIA in a Democratic Society (New York: Oxford University Press 1989), 59. 
8 Elizabeth Rindskopf Parker, The American Experience: One Model for Intelligence Oversight in a 
Democracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, Project on Justice in Times of Transition, 15 October 
2001), 2. 
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safeguard the security and well-being of the nation and its people, to good governance, 
and efficient and effective functioning of the state.”9  
To summarize, intelligence is essential, but at the same time it is one of the most 
challenging aspects of SSR because it fundamentally clashes with principles such as 
accountability and transparency and may imperil human rights and civil liberties. 
There is no panacea for the intelligence versus democratic principles conundrum.  
The right balance between the freedom innate to a democracy and the emphasis on 
security of the intelligence agencies is a matter of degree, depending on the particularities 
of each country and its perceptions of the threat-environment.  However, new 
democracies attempt to copy or follow the model of modern, consolidated democracies to 
benefit from their experience.  But in the case of new democracies, the dilemma of 
balancing democratization with the maintenance of adequate intelligence efficiency and 
effectiveness is accentuated by a new problem: the authoritarian legacy.  In the old days 
of the former regimes, the intelligence apparatus was associated with an instrument of 
coercion and oppression, perhaps the most important one.  Consequently, intelligence 
reforms are hampered by the obstruction of intelligence agencies, who are unwilling to 
relinquish the power they once retained, the stigma that the same agencies carried in the 
eyes of the civil society (memories of the past are hard to obliterate), and the lack of 
interest of politicians (debates on intelligence are confidential and rarely result in votes).  
Furthermore, the security institutions and implicitly the intelligence agencies of the new 
democracies must undergo a dual set of reforms.  In these countries, intelligence agencies 
are subject not only to “a static end situation but to a dynamic end state” and “internal 
transformation has to be thus subsumed to a double process of transformation 
[international transformation].”10 On the one hand, these countries have to democratize, 
which means dealing with the past and getting rid of the remnants of the former regime; 
while on the other hand, they have to align themselves to the transformation process 
initiated by the modern democracies in order to counter the new threats.  In other words, 
new democracies must catch-up with the consolidated democracies and reach their level 
                                                 
9 DCAF, 6. 
10 George Maior and Sebastian Huluban “Interdependent Transformation or Transforming Together.  
Revisiting Government–Intelligence Relations” (Unpublished manuscript, to be published as book chapter 
by Ashgate Publishing in 2007), 10. 
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of democratic reforms, while simultaneously developing within the parameters reached 
by the consolidated democracies.  Functioning within dual process (becoming democratic 
and countering new security threats) is even more cumbersome when one considers the 
economic and social reforms that a new democracy must develop.  Consequently, 
intelligence reforms are much more challenging in a new democracy than in a 
consolidated one for several reasons: limited time for the build-up of mature democratic 
institutions; fewer resources (financial and human) available for the reforms; the 
multiple-scope trait of intelligence reforms (democratization and countering new security 
threats) and their dual task of attaining and sustaining the level of efficiency and 
democratization of Western intelligence agencies; and finally the “cleansing” of the 
intelligence officers linked to former regimes, which creates personnel problems. 
Romania parallels this pattern.  After the Revolution of 1989, it adopted 
intelligence reforms at a slow pace.  The first steps were to break up the former security 
intelligence apparatus (The Department of State Security — Securitate) into several 
agencies and then to implement legislation to ensure some civilian oversight and control 
over intelligence agencies.11  On paper, everything looked good, but practically, major 
changes were disregarded. At the same time, the Romanian media had reported scandals 
related to the intelligence agencies.  Nowadays the reform of the intelligence community 
is again scrutinized.  A new draft of the National Security Strategy is in the initial phase 
of elaboration, and a package of laws that aims to regulate the security sector is being 
debated in the specialized commissions of Parliament.  However, despite concerns by the 
media and in academic circles, studies on the issue of intelligence reform are scarce in the 
public sector.  This thesis is intended to help fill this vacuum. 
B. HYPOTHESIS 
This thesis analyzes the perils challenging intelligence reforms in a new 
democratic regime in order to find out the consequences of current or future attempts to 
transform the intelligence community in Romania.  It intends to study the major academic 
debates on intelligence and then apply the theoretical framework to the Romanian case. 
                                                 
11 Deletant observed how the post-revolutionary agencies were “each formed around the nucleus of a 
former Securitate directorate or unit.” Source: Dennis Deletant, “The Successors to the Securitate” in 
Kieran Williams and Dennis Deletant, Security Intelligence Services in New Democracies (New York: 
Palgrave, 2001), 219. 
5 
This thesis focuses on the causal relationship between democracy and its major 
impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of the intelligence community.  To be more 
specific, if the intelligence community is democratized, then its ability to fulfill its 
functions and conduct its activities may be hampered.12  The key issue is to identify a 
proper balance between the need for good intelligence and a respect for democratic 
values.  The two are separated by a thin line that is easily crossed; on the one hand, too 
much focus on democracy may impede good intelligence, and on the other hand, too 
much freedom of action of the intelligence community may lead to a disregard of 
democratic values and norms and may even endanger the existence of a democratic 
regime.  No matter the nature and form of this trade-off, one thing is certain: A 
democracy must compromise some of its most precious values and norms in order to 
protect itself, but in the same time must be careful not to consume itself.  This is the 
paradox of this cultural relationship: For the sake of safeguarding freedom, one needs to 
sacrifice some of it.  For the sake of protecting a right (ultimately, the right to live), one 
needs to give up other civil liberties.  This trade-off has to be understood in order to be 
accepted.  Both politicians and intelligence officers must be aware of the need for this 
compromise in order not to fall into the extremes. 
The fundamental issue dealt with in this thesis is the problematic compatibility 
between democracy and intelligence, which could be considered a part of the broader 
freedom versus security debate.  This leads to specific discussions on intelligence as 
organization: the control exercised by civilian authorities, the role and mandate of 
intelligence agencies, the structure of the intelligence community, and professionalization 
of the personnel.  Intelligence as a process is also briefly discussed in this thesis, 
particularly the impact of democratization on the intelligence cycle, starting from its 
direction by decision-makers, through the collection, processing, and analysis phases, and 
then its dissemination back to the consumers. 
The question is how to regulate intelligence in order to keep it both effective and 
democratic.  How do democratic reforms affect intelligence, both as a process and as an 
organization?  What is the proper level of accountability of intelligence agencies and 
                                                 
12 This process of making the intelligence community work in a democracy is referred in public 
debates as democratization of intelligence and this thesis will use the term in this precise sense. 
6 
which civilian authorities should exercise control?  How do policy-makers interact with 
intelligence agencies?  What are the functions of intelligence agencies and how should 
they be accomplished?  Is there a proper structure for the organization of the intelligence 
community?  How should the behavior of intelligence officers be shaped, and how should 
they be trained and educated?  Finally, what is the impact of democratization on the 
component aspects of the intelligence process?  What should we ask from intelligence 
agencies and how do we ameliorate their course of collection, analysis and 
dissemination? 




A—The independent variable (IV): democratization of intelligence 
B—The dependent variable (DV): efficiency and effectiveness of 
intelligence 
C—The antecedent condition (AC) that multiplies A Æ B causal 
relationship: new democratic regime and authoritarian legacy 
r, s ,t, u—The intervening variables (IntV): role of intelligence, 
structure of intelligence, control of intelligence, professionalization of 
intelligence 
 
Figure 1.   Arrow-diagram of the hypothesis 
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The diagram should be read as follows. In a new democratic regime with a strong 
authoritarian legacy (AC), democratization of intelligence (IV) causes changes to the 
role, structure, control, and professionalization of intelligence (IntV), thus causing a 
decrease in the efficiency and effectiveness of intelligence (DV).   
The most important characteristic of this relationship is the presence of a feedback 
loop (dashed line).  The information regarding the impact of democratization on the 
efficiency and effectiveness of intelligence is sent back to the policy-makers who initiate 
the reforms, and makes them aware of the results of policies and reforms.  If the outcome 
of democratization is a decrease in efficiency and effectiveness, then the policy-makers 
may correct this relationship by lessening the process of democratization, which would 
lead to a reverse effect on the outcome.  Ideally, the purpose of corrective actions is to 
maintain equilibrium between the independent and the dependent variables, i.e., between 
the democratization of intelligence and its efficiency and effectiveness. 
The purpose of this thesis is to focus on the intervening variables, not to study the 
independent and dependent variables or the antecedent conditions.  This thesis analyzes 
how the independent and dependent variables affect each other through the intervening 
variables, including the role of intelligence, its control, its structure, and its 
professionalization. 
C. METHODOLOGY AND STRUCTURE 
This thesis is mainly theory-testing and policy-evaluative.  It explores the idea 
that democratization affects the efficiency and effectiveness of intelligence.  This thesis 
assesses the literature on this topic and, based on the theoretical background, it will 
observe and evaluate the impact of intelligence reforms in a new democracy.  The main 
case-study is Romania, with a limited number of examples from other countries selected 
for comparative analysis.  Without intending to become policy-prescriptive, the summary 
of findings will nevertheless constitute a forecast revealing the consequences of current 
and future policy steps.  It may thus provide alternative courses of action for policy- and 
decision-makers, increasing their awareness regarding the effects of reform efforts. 
The primary theme of this thesis is the relationship between politics and 
intelligence in a new democracy.  Politics and intelligence clearly interact, as it will be 
8 
shown by the end of this introduction.  Each chapter will then address areas of friction 
between state bodies and intelligence agencies: the role, the structure, the control and the 
professionalization of intelligence. 
D. DEFINITIONS 
In order to clarify several concepts used in this thesis, some definitions are 
needed.  The word phenomenon, when referring to “intelligence” in the title of the thesis, 
is determined by its definition: “A fact or event of scientific interest susceptible to 
scientific description and explanation.”13 This definition not only incorporates all 
meanings of intelligence, but it also suggests the academic attempts to study the topic.  
Throughout the paper, the term intelligence refers the community, unless otherwise 
specified (as process or product). 
There are a large number of theories on democracy and democratization.  In this 
thesis, democracy refers to the liberal democracy concept (as opposed to the defective 
types of democracy), based on liberal constitutionalism and the rule of law which 
guarantee a pluralist political system dominated by the democratically legitimated 
authorities.14  Central to this liberal type of democracy is individual freedom (expressed 
here as human and civil rights and liberties).  For a variety of reasons (philosophical 
legacy, religion, politics etc.), in a liberal democracy, “The individual as an autonomous 
person with inalienable rights also constitutes, as a citizen, the main objective of the state, 
and is the central part of social and political organization.”15  Freedom is thus not some 
immaterial idea, but it is a tangible value enshrined in legal/constitutional provisions.  We 
know what we mean by freedom (respect for human rights and civil liberties) and we 
know when freedom is violated.  In addition, freedom is about the individual.16  It would 
seem that freedom and intelligence operate at different levels.  Freedom is about the 
                                                 
13 Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 11th edition (Springfield MA: Merriam Webster’s Inc., 
2001), 929. 
14 For more details, see Wolfgang Merkel and Aurel Croissant, “Defective Democracies: Concept and 
Causes,” Central European Political Science Review (quarterly of the Central European Political Science 
Association, vol. 1, no. 2, December 2000). 
15 See Edwin R.  Micevski, “Strategic Cultures – Definitions, Problems, Challenges” in Edwin R. 
Micewski, ed. Ethics and International Politics (Vienna: Literas, 2001), 66. 
16 However, freedom may become a collective value if, for example, the independence of a state is the 
center of the debate, since it is perceived as the sum of the aspirations for self-determination of a certain 
number of individuals. 
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broad cultural environment, while intelligence is more about organizational culture.  In 
order to maintain an adequate proportion of these dimensions, it is worth mentioning that 
in a democracy, the overall emphasis on freedom and the “power of the people” translates 
into expectations at the organizational level.  Thus, institutions and organizations must be 
transparent (people must be able to see what is going on in an organization, to check if it 
commits abuses), must be open (people must be able to participate in the organization’s 
process), and must be accountable (the organization has to be controlled, ultimately by 
the people who hold the power and vest that authority in representatives).  Consequently, 
in this thesis, democracy refers to freedom, accountability, transparency and openness, 
while democratization refers to the process that makes an organization (in our case, the 
intelligence agencies) respect these values and norms. 
Efficiency and effectiveness lack units of measurement.  Michael Herman, a 
British scholar and former intelligence officer, remarks that intelligence efficiency and 
effectiveness are “hard to measure” and the outcome of the process is hardly the object of 
a “traditional cost-benefit analysis.” There is no “perfect system of accountancy” that 
could quantify intelligence efficiency and effectiveness.17  Effectiveness can be 
approached in the sense that intelligence failures indicate lack of effectiveness, but that 
does not necessarily translate to mean that absence of failures signifies effective 
intelligence.  Sometimes, there are means to identify whether the intelligence (as product) 
was timely and accurate.  On the other hand, efficiency is the least knowable domain 
because of the need to protect the process (how information is obtained, by whom, at 
what costs).18 
To summarize, the term effectiveness is used in this thesis as “the result of the 
intelligence process; the value of the product.”  Ideally, effectiveness shows whether the 
intelligence agencies fulfill their functions.  Efficiency refers to “the process or how the 
intelligence agencies achieve their results.” 
                                                 
17 Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, (Cambridge U.K.: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), 298-300. 
18 Thomas Bruneau, “Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: The Hedgehog and the Fox 
Revisited” in Revista Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad, (Santiago de Chile: vol.1/2005), 111-131. 
10 
Control is another concept that lacks an exact definition.  In a study on 
intelligence, the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) offers 
the following definitions: “Control, in the narrowest sense, means ensuring that specific 
procedures are followed.  In the broadest sense, it means creating the conditions that lead 
to the achievement of agreed standards of performance, including the desired results as 
well as compliance with law and policy.”  Another concept, accountability, refers to “a 
relationship based on the obligation to demonstrate and be responsible for performance in 
light of agreed expectations.”19  And oversight is “the power to hold the executive 
accountable” and takes the form of a process both proactive and reactive.20  Peter Gill, a 
leading British scholar in the field of intelligence, distinguishes between accountability, 
which “refers to the liability of an agency to explain or justify its actions to some other 
body,” and control, which “refers to the situation in which some outside body manages or 
directs the actions of the security agency.”21  Jean-Paul Brodeur and Nicolas Dupeyron, a 
Canadian and, respectively, a French researcher in the field of intelligence, define 
accountability as “an information process whereby an agency is under a legal obligation 
to answer truly and completely the questions put to it by an authority to which it is 
accountable.”  Moreover, “True accountability is directed to an external authority.  Being 
accountable only to oneself is being accountable to no one,” while control consists of 
“measures—systemic reforms and individual sanctions—taken on the basis of the 
information provided by an agency.”22  In his study on civilian control over the military, 
Harold Trinkunas proposes another distinction (which could be extrapolated from the 
military to the intelligence sector) between “control by containment,” which is about 
restraining “jurisdictional activities,” and “control by oversight,” which refers to 
“military exclusion from political activities and active civilian supervision of military 
affairs.”23 
                                                 
19 DCAF, 39. 
20 Ibid., 47. 
21 Peter Gill, “Security and Intelligence Services in the United Kingdom” in Jean-Paul Brodeur, Peter 
Gill and Dennis Töllborg, eds. Democracy, Law and Security.  Internal Security Services in Contemporary 
Europe (Hampshire/England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2003), 282-283. 
22 Jean-Paul Brodeur and Nicolas Dupeyron, “Democracy and Secrecy: The French Intelligence 
Community” in Brodeur, Gill and Töllborg, 19. 
23 Harold Trinkunas, Crafting Civilian Control of the Military in Venezuela.  A Comparative 
Perspective (University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 19. 
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In order to synthesize these debates and simplify the use of the concept, in this 
thesis, control is generally defined as both “direction and monitoring (oversight) of the 
intelligence agencies,” unless otherwise stated. 
E. INTELLIGENCE AND POLITICS 
1. Theoretical Aspects 
Since this thesis evolves around the interaction between intelligence and politics, 
a brief analysis of this relationship is necessary. In order to assess the relationship 
between intelligence and politics, this thesis uses the model developed by Peter Gill: the 
Gore-Tex state.24  
 
 
Figure 2.   The Gore-Tex state (From: Gill, Policing Politics, 80) 
 
Gill starts by identifying several levels of the state: the first level—intelligence 
community; the second level—executive body; the third level—legislative and judiciary 
bodies; and the fourth level—civil society.  He then builds a typology of intelligence 
agencies.  The “core” of his model, intelligence, relates to the other “layers” in terms of 
autonomy (dotted line), representing the degree to which intelligence is influenced by 
state and society, and penetration, representing the degree to which intelligence 
influences state and society.  Depending on these degrees of autonomy and penetration, 
                                                 
24 Peter Gill, Policing Politics.  Security Intelligence and the Liberal Democratic State (New York: 
Frank Cass, 1994), 79-83. 
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Gill classifies the ideal types of security intelligence agencies: “independent security 
state, political police, and domestic intelligence bureau.”  He then shows how the nature 
of the Gore-Tex state (weak or strong) reflects the mandate, structure and accountability 
of the intelligence community.  The domestic intelligence bureau (DIB) is a model of 
particular relevance to our discussion.  The DIB is a concept formulated by Keller and 
reinterpreted by Gill, referring to the ideal type of an intelligence agency in a democratic 
regime.  The DIB mandate shapes the agency as one with “limited and specific powers 
derived from a charter or statute,” whose main function is “to gather information relating 
to the criminal prosecution of security offences,” without conducting “aggressive 
countering operations against citizens or political groups.”  The control issue may be 
inferred from the arguments regarding autonomy from politics and penetration into 
society: DIB is “subject to firm ministerial control, relying primarily on open source 
material and not engaging in countering activities.”25  DIB is specific to what Gill calls a 
“weak” Gore-Tex state (low degrees of autonomy and penetration).  It is worth 
mentioning that Keller discusses two slightly different levels from Gill: autonomy (from 
executive control) and insularity (from external oversight, such as legislative or judicial).  
He also places DIB in the low autonomy-low penetration cell and considers it the 
“desired agency for a liberal democracy.”26 
 
Table 1. A Typology of Security Intelligence Agencies (From: Gill, Policing Politics, 82) 
 
  Penetration 
 High Medium Low 
High Independent Security State   
Medium  Political Police  
Autonomy 
Low   DIB 
Mark Lowenthal, an eminent American intelligence official and academic, studies 
the role of the policy-makers in the intelligence process, arguing that “they do more than 
receive intelligence; they shape it.”27  He focuses on the influence that politicians may 
                                                 
25 Gill, 60-82. 
26 Williams and Deletant, 3. 
27 Mark M.  Lowenthal, Intelligence.  From Secrets to Policy, 2nd ed. (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 
2003), 139. 
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exert (or may not, depending on their behavior) at every stage of the intelligence process 
(intelligence requirements, collection, analysis, covert actions).  He also approaches the 
sensitive issue of “politicized intelligence” and remarks that, ideally, there should be “a 
great divide” between policy-makers and intelligence.  This means that the two spheres 
should be separated by a “semi-permeable membrane” that allows policy-makers to cross 
into the intelligence realm, but not vice versa.28 
Michael Handel, former professor at the U.S. Naval War College and author of 
numerous studies on intelligence, also notes the special interaction between the 
intelligence community and policy-makers which consists of a trade-off between “the 
professional independence of the former and the authority of the latter.”  Furthermore, he 
warns of the same risk of politicization, which is caused by politicians tempted to use 
intelligence in order to promote their own political interests.29 
Kieran Williams and Dennis Deletant, British analysts of intelligence affairs in 
Eastern Europe, analyze the former Romanian security intelligence agency (Securitate) 
former, which was the repressive apparatus of the communist rulers during the former 
regime, and point out the immense powers it amassed in its last years.  Deletant then 
studies the implications of the Securitate legacy for the post-1989 intelligence community 
and its relations with the state and society, which is best characterized as “old habits die 
hard.”30 
Thomas Bruneau and Kenneth Dombroski, American researchers at the U.S. 
Naval Postgraduate School in the field of intelligence, note the difficulties of young 
democracies when dealing with intelligence, especially their “little public awareness of 
intelligence functions and organizations,” due to a combination of fear and/or 
ignorance.31  Contrary to the consolidated democracies, newer regimes lack the time that 
                                                 
28Mark M.  Lowenthal, Intelligence.  From Secrets to Policy, 2nd ed. (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 
2003), 4-5. 
29 Michael Handel, “Intelligence and The Problem of Strategic Surprise” in Richard K Betts and 
Thomas G. Mahnken, eds. Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence. Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel, 
(Portland OR: Frank Cass, 2003), 26. 
30 Deletant, “The Securitate Legacy in Romania,” 160-198. 
31 Thomas C. Bruneau and Kenneth Dombroski, “Reforming Intelligence: The Challenge of Control in 
New Democracies,” (Monterey: Proceedings from an international roundtable on intelligence and 
democracy, CCMR, NPS August 2004), 5-7. 
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allows the strengthening of those institutions, which are designed to regulate the 
interaction between state, society and intelligence.  Dombroski also elaborates on Gill’s 
model and offer an alternative model that illustrates a more flexible, relative typology of 
intelligence agencies based on their autonomy and penetration. 
 
 
Figure 3.   A typology of security intelligence agencies (From: Dombroski, 
Reforming Intelligence, 7) 
 
Furthermore, Bruneau and Dombroski offer a general view on the regime types 
that correspond to the different types of intelligence agencies, based on their emphasis on 
national security (as counterweight to freedom) and perception of the level of internal 
threat. 
Generally, a domestic intelligence bureau is the intelligence agency within a 
democracy; the political police is found within an authoritarian regime, while an 









In a new democracy, for several reasons, politicians might not be interested in 
developing expertise in intelligence matters or tools to control the intelligence agencies,32  
Due to the fact that politicians are held accountable by their constituencies and that their 
primary mission is to amass sufficient electoral capital in order to get re-elected, they 
tend to be less willing to deal with intelligence-related issues.  Generally, these matters 
are secret and do not offer as much publicity as other topics, except in cases of 
emergency or major scandals involving the intelligence community. 
Fear or ignorance may be another reason that contributes to this reluctance of the 
politicians to actively pursue their control over the intelligence community.33  Also, 
politicians may distrust intelligence agencies because they are usually less affected by 
governmental changes (outside the electoral game) and the agencies’ loyalty does not 
reside with a certain political party or ideology, but with other higher interests (national 
security or simply the State).  Conversely, relationship between politicians and the 
intelligence community that is too close that may result in the politicization of 
intelligence, which may lead to the use of the intelligence apparatus as political police.  
There are several meanings for the term politicization with regard to intelligence:34 
• Intelligence is politicized when it becomes “a point of contention between 
organized political groupings”—his is “partisan politicization.” 
• Intelligence is politicized when it becomes “involved in public policy 
choices and the ordering of power”—this is “bipartisan politicization.” 
• Intelligence is politicized when its estimates are “influenced by imbedded 
policy positions”—this is “intelligence to please.” 
The distance or proximity between politicians and intelligence affects the overall 
intelligence cycle (direction, collection, analysis, processing and dissemination, as 
defined by Herman, Lowenthal and many other scholars).  If politicians do not establish a 
list of priorities and do not request proper information from the intelligence agencies, the 
collection of information tends to become indiscriminate (when everything and nothing is 
relevant: “the more, the better”).  On the other hand, if intelligence is politicized, it may 
                                                 
32 Thomas Bruneau, “Controlling Intelligence in New Democracies” in Loch Johnson and James 
Wirtz,eds. Strategic Intelligence.  Windows into a Secret World (Los Angeles: Roxbury Publishing 
Company, 2004), 448-449. 
33 Bruneau and Dombroski, 6. 
34 Harry Howe Ransom, “The Politicization of Intelligence” in Johnson and Wirtz, 171. 
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be geared toward collecting, analyzing and producing biased information that supports 
certain political preferences35.  Analysis may also be hampered by intelligence analysts 
providing a biased product to their consumers (either to provide what the latter wants to 
hear or drive/manipulate policy-making in a certain direction).  Dissemination may also 
be limited due to the classified character of the final intelligence product.  If politicians 
are considered to be possible leaks of information, their access to intelligence may be 
restricted.36  Politicians themselves may disregard intelligence if they do not trust it or if 
it does not coincide with their preconceptions.  Likewise, due to the “funnel” set-up of 
the intelligence process, politicians may lack the means to consume the amount of 
information that results from the collection and analysis process37. The “funnel” is used 
to describe the relationship between the information produced and the capacity of the 
consumers (policy-makers) to absorb it.  Herman’s key finding is that no matter how 
much intelligence is produced, the amount that may be used by policy-makers is always 
limited. 
Jeanne Kinney-Giraldo, American scholar and researcher at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, elaborated on the role that the nature of the regime (presidentialism 
or parliamentarism, essentially differentiated by the conflict of interest between 
parliament and government) and sub-regime factors, such as a party and the electoral 
system, affect the general legislative/executive relationship.  She argues that electoral 
systems (proportional/winner-take-all, nominal/lists) influence “the number of parties, 
their level of discipline, and their programmatic interests” and thus have a greater impact 
on the separation of powers.  The conclusion is that in general, governing parties are 
more interested in the formulation stage of policies (relevant role of party leaders, party 
discipline and number of parties), while opposition parties pay more attention to 
exercising oversight (and usually lack power to intervene in direct control).38  In the case 
                                                 
35 Johnson, 60-64. 
36 Holt, 3. 
37 Herman, 45. 
38 Jeanne Kinney-Giraldo, “Legislatures and National Defense: Global Comparisons” in Thomas 
Bruneau, ed. “Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relation” (to be published, 
Austin TX:  University of Texas Press, 2006), 53-58. 
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of intelligence, this would mean that political opposition is interested in being part of the 
parliamentary specialized committees that oversee intelligence agencies. 
2. Intelligence and Politics in Romania 
In Romania, there is a mixture of both attraction and fear that characterizes 
perceptions on intelligence.  The regime factors and sub-factors of the semi-presidential 
system make the present Romanian political system highly confrontational.  A fragile 
political coalition is in power and has a bare majority in the Parliament (two bigger 
parties—Liberal and Democrat; and two smaller parties—Conservative and Democratic 
Union of the Hungarian Minority).  The Nationalists (the Greater Romania Party) and 
Social-Democrats form the opposition.  The Prime-Minister is the head of the Liberal 
Party, while the President of Romania is the former head of the Democrat Party (this 
double-headed executive branch already offers incentives for competition for power).  
The heads of the two Parliamentary Chambers are both Social-Democrats.  To 
summarize, Romania has a multi-polar political configuration in which intelligence is 
seen as vital.  In a political environment where each political group is trying to have an 
edge over the competition, intelligence becomes closely connected to politics in the sense 
that each political faction attempts to control it or at least to prevent its control by its 
rivals. 
In this environment of low autonomy and insularity (in Keller’s terms), a certain 
degree of politicization of intelligence is unavoidable; not only are intelligence agencies 
(or their product) used as “weapon” against political forces, but the intelligence agencies 
themselves try to influence the political scene as well (culminating with the famous 
declaration of the former head of Romanian Security Intelligence, Virgil Magureanu, 
stating that: “President Constantinescu won the elections of 1996 with my help.  I acted 
in such a manner to rally political parties to his side”39).  Building on Max Weber’s view 
on bureaucracy, it may be that the Romanian intelligence community follows the general 
pattern of any bureaucracy (to ensure its survival) and tends to control itself, expand and 
gain more autonomy (in its ultimate sense, to “usurp” power). 
                                                 
39 Ioana Lupea, “Magureanu: Talpes pleca la americani cu mapa, pe asta si-a construit cariera,” in 
Evenimentul Zilei (Bucharest), May 27, 2005. Available at http://www.evz.ro/article.php?artid=187286 
(last accessed: March 03, 2006). 
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Finally, the following is a list of the main Romanian intelligence agencies that are 
analyzed in this thesis: 
• The Romanian Intelligence Service (Serviciul Roman de Informatii—
SRI), the autonomous domestic security intelligence agency. 
• The Foreign Intelligence Service (Serviciul de Informatii Externe—SIE), 
the autonomous foreign intelligence agency. 
• The Service for Protection and Guard (Serviciul de Protectie si Paza—
SPP), the autonomous security intelligence agency responsible for the 
protection of Romanian and foreign dignitaries, but also has intelligence 
capabilities. 
• The Special Telecommunications Service (Serviciul de Transmisiuni 
Speciale—STS), the autonomous signals and communications intelligence 
agency. 
• The Defense General Directorate for Intelligence (Directia Generala de 
Informatii a Apararii—DGIA), the military intelligence agency, part of the 
Romanian Ministry of National Defense (MoD). 
• The General Directorate for Intelligence and Internal Protection (Directia 
Generala de Informatii si Protectie Interna—DGIPI), the intelligence 
agency of the Romanian Ministry of Interior and Administration (MoI). 
It is worth mentioning the current dismantlement of another relevant intelligence 
agency — the General Directorate for Protection and Anti-Corruption (Directia Generala 
pentru Protectie si Anticoruptie—DGPA), which is the intelligence agency of the 
Romanian Ministry of Justice (MoJ).  At the proposal of the Minister of Justice, the 
Romanian government made the decision to dismantle this agency on January 26, 2006.  
This process is supposed to take 90 days during which the personnel are to be dismissed 
and compensated or reassigned to other intelligence agencies.  Meanwhile, the 
responsibilities of the DGPA are to be transferred to other institutions with 
responsibilities in the field.  The rationale behind this move was a result of a “self-
evaluation” of the DGPA and MoJ, which took place between April and October 2005, 
which revealed a number of problems within the DGPA, including human rights abuses 
in prisons, misuse of funds, exertion of influence on the judiciary, and the creation of an 
illegal database that focused on politicians.40  Another important reason behind the 
                                                 
40 Source: Romanian newspapers – Cotidianul, Azi and Gandul, available at 
http://www.gardianul.ro/index.php?a=primapagina2006012703.xml; http://www.azi.ro/arhive/2006/01/28-
29/justitie.htm, and http://www.gandul.info/2006-01-27/actual/spionii_justitiei (last accessed: March 03, 
2006). 
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dismantlement of the DGPA was the criticism received in the EU Commission’s Report 
on Romania (October 2004), which accused this agency of a “lack of transparency and 
accountability” and concluded that “the rationale for the existence of a militarized 
security service within the Ministry of Justice remains to be demonstrated.”41 
                                                 
41 Source: EU Commission October 2004 Regular Report on Romania’s progress towards accession, 
21, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2004/pdf/rr_ro_2004_en.pdf  (last accessed: 
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II. THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the role that an intelligence agency plays 
or should play in a democracy.  The first section is dedicated to the academic debate on 
this topic, while the second section deals with the Romanian case.  The main questions to 
be answered are: What is the proper role of intelligence in a democracy? Who establishes 
this role?  What are the implications of the mandate of intelligence? 
A. THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE — THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
According to Gill, “National security provides the most general security 
intelligence mandate,”42 but emphasizes that, due to the broadness of security as a 
concept, it is essential to establish a limited legal mandate for the intelligence agencies, 
based on a clear identification of the threats to national security.43  As already mentioned 
in the introduction, Gill sees the ideal security intelligence agency in a democracy as the 
domestic intelligence bureau (DIB) whose mandate should be stipulated in a charter or 
statute and whose primary functions should be limited to collection and analysis.  The 
DIB should refrain from the exercise of aggressive covert action or counter-intelligence 
against citizens or political organizations, which implies that the intelligence community 
respects human rights and civil liberties and is not politicized. 
Herman states that, in Western democracies, the intelligence system comprises 
“the collection of information by special means and […] the subsequent study of 
particular subjects, using all available information from all sources.”44  Lowenthal is very 
firm on this issue: “Intelligence exists solely to support policy-makers.”  He argues that 
intelligence agencies have four major raisons d’être: to avoid strategic surprise, to 
provide long-time expertise, to support the policy process, and to maintain the secrecy of 
information, needs and methods.”45  Finally, Bruneau and Dombroski argue that “The 
                                                 
42 Gill, Policing Politics, 91. 
43 Ibid., 127. 
44 Herman, 56. 
45 Lowenthal, 2-4. 
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most important function [of intelligence organizations] is informing the government of 
what it needs to know about external and internal threats.”46 
In summary, the primary role of an intelligence agency in a democracy should be 
to inform and support policy.  “To inform” relates to the intelligence process and is more 
passive (inform policy-makers regarding the crimes against the state, and the capabilities 
and intentions of potential threats), while “support policy” refers to counter-intelligence, 
operations and covert action and is more active (support policies/strategies established by 
the policy-makers).  It is worth mentioning that covert actions should be an aspect of the 
foreign intelligence and military intelligence agencies and should only be carried out 
abroad.  This is an interesting attribute of democratic regimes, whose domestic and 
foreign activities are carried out differently.  For example, domestically, the collection of 
information is limited by law since the law has to protect human rights and civil liberties 
(such as the right to privacy).  At the same time, legal limits are also placed on 
intelligence agencies’ foreign activities, especially its covert actions, but these limits are 
much broader and flexible.47  As a result, a double standard exists concerning operations 
conducted abroad and directed toward non-native actors and citizens.  Intelligence 
agencies are allowed to break laws in other countries as long as the infractions are 
plausibly deniable48; but domestic unlawful actions against one’s own citizens are 
restricted.49  The lines between the two realms (domestic and foreign) may become 
blurred. 
Further problems may arise when these two areas are constrained by the 
institutional and cultural particularities of different countries.  For example, overlapping 
occur between law enforcement and intelligence (“Rules governing the collection of 
intelligence must not be confused with those applicable to the collection of information 
                                                 
46 Bruneau and Dombroski, 8. 
47 Lahneman, 7-8. 
48 Bruneau and Dombroski, 13. 
49 This last point raises another question: how should we deal with an alleged terrorist?  The FBI, for 
example, dominated by a “cop culture” (oriented toward law enforcement, prosecution), is primarily 
reactive (it requires hard evidence to arrest the alleged terrorist).  But the FBI has few, if any, preventive 
tools.  If the alleged terrorist is a real terrorist, then there is no problem in monitoring him; however, if he is 
not a terrorist, all surveillance methods are clearly a violation of civil rights and liberties, at least morally, if 
not legally. 
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for law enforcement purposes.”)50  While intelligence is mainly about prevention, law 
enforcement agencies are about reaction.  Their mandate is complicated by an even larger 
contextual dilemma—that of the liberty versus security.  Democracies are very sensitive 
when it comes to freedom and tend to solve the freedom-security contradiction in favor of 
freedom.  As George Maior, Romanian scholar and chairman of the Commission for 
Defense, Public Order and National Security of the Romanian Senate, and Sebastian 
Huluban, Romanian researcher in defense affairs, put it, “Unfortunately, we probably do 
not think enough how much our security [read intelligence] might be affected by not 
challenging the prejudice on the so-called sensitivity of our liberty.  As the events of 9/11 
showed, we tend to underestimate the importance of our security for the sake of a taboo, 
the sensitivity of our liberty, even at our peril.”51 
Moreover, the mandate of intelligence agencies is usually built on a preliminary 
assessment of threats to national security.  But then, national security is such a vast and 
vague concept.  In practice, the mandate appears to be clear only with regard to what is 
forbidden, not what is allowed, and is mainly directed towards the avoidance of any 
infringement on civil rights and liberties. 
Finally, following the same lines, Michael Handel perceives intelligence as an 
instrument used by policy-makers to achieve their goals.  In his view, the main role of 
intelligence is to reduce uncertainty and avoid surprise so that both political and military 
leaders may “improve the quality of their decisions, develop more effective strategies, or 
conduct more successful military operations.”52 
To conclude, in a democracy, the mandate of intelligence agencies should have a 
legal basis (stipulated by law), and it should be issued by democratically elected 
authorities in accordance to democratic principles. 
B. THE ROMANIAN CASE 
In Romania, the mandate and attributes of the intelligence agencies are stipulated 
by laws.  In the case of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI) and the Foreign 
                                                 
50 Elizabeth Rindskopf Parker, 2. 
51 Maior and Huluban, 2. 
52 Michael Handel, “Leaders and Intelligence” in Michael Handel, ed. Leaders and Intelligence 
(Totowa NJ: Frank Cass & Co Ltd., 1989), 3. 
24 
Intelligence Service (SIE), they even have constitutional grounds.  In contrast, some of 
the attributes of the departmental intelligence agencies (that belong to a minister, e.g., the 
Defense General Directorate for Intelligence–DGIA/Minister of Defense and the General 
Directorate for Intelligence and Internal Protection–DGIPI/Minister of Internal Affairs) 
are derived from the legal framework that regulates the activity of their respective 
ministries.  In other words, DGIA and DGIPI are placed under the institutional and legal 
umbrella of the MoD and MoI, respectively. 
An important fact is that none of the Romanian intelligence agencies has 
prosecutorial authority and are not endowed with the powers of arrest and detention.  
However, they are closely connected to law enforcement and the judicial authorities who 
issue their warrants. 
In spite of this broad legal framework, operationally, their record has been far 
from perfect.  The post-1989 history of Romanian intelligence (especially security 
intelligence) is replete with scandals related to repeated violations of civil rights and 
liberties and charges of politicization due to intelligence agencies being accused of 
attempting to compromise political leaders. Deletant presents a series of cases that show 
“the threat posed by discretionary actions of the Romanian security services to the 
exercise of democracy in Romania.”53 
Little is known about the current package of laws that is supposed to re-regulate 
all activities in the national security field (including intelligence).  The legislative 
material is confidential and has been sent by the National Supreme Defense Council 
(Consiliul Suprem de Aparare a Tarii/CSAT—an executive body similar to the U.S. 
National Security Council) in the specialized commissions of the Parliament for review.  
If approved, the CSAT will initiate procedures to transform the legislative material into 
bills, which will be sent to the Parliament and debated in public sessions (and this implies 
a debate in the civil society). 
Despite some leaks in the media, the present public discussion is based on 
speculations, since officials are reluctant to confirm the plausibility of the information 
debated by the journalists.  However, most newspapers hint at the possibility that the SRI 
                                                 
53 Deletant, “Successors,” 231-243. 
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and DGIPI will be granted the power of arrest and detention, with a legal mandate.  The 
domestic security intelligence agencies are also likely to receive more powers when it 
comes to the surveillance of alleged terrorists or criminals.  The debate may be 
influenced by recent evolutions in the intelligence field.  In the last few months, the SRI 
twice expelled foreign nationals based on vaguely formulated accusations (at least from a 
legal point of view).  Several Muslims have been accused of Islamic fundamentalist and 
terrorist propaganda and have allegedly been connected to the Al-Qaeda network.  The 
fact that they were simply expelled and not indicted in a tribunal may be related to the 
intelligence cycle.  The intelligence presented by the SRI may have been collected 
illegally and therefore not usable in a court of law.  There is little debate on this topic in 
the media, but the actions have been presented as a success of the Romanian intelligence. 
As a final comment, all Romanian intelligence agencies are legally allowed to 
cooperate at the international level (e.g., at NATO level).  This aspect is highly relevant 
because, viewed in the broader perspective of Romania’s Euro-Atlantic integration 
process, it offers more incentives for the alignment of Romanian intelligence agencies to 
the democratic values and norms inherent in the Euro-Atlantic community. 
1. The Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI) 
The mandate of the SRI is limited by law to domestic security and is focused on 
collection and analysis.  The “SRI organizes and conducts activities of gathering, 
checking and utilizing intelligence for the identification, prevention and counteracting of 
actions that may, according to the law, endanger the national security of Romania.”54  
The SRI has thus collection and analysis capabilities.  It is also the main agency 
responsible for the protection of intelligence and prevention of leakages (counter-
intelligence).  In addition, the SRI is the primary agency with responsibilities in the 
counter-terrorism field.  In this respect, it represents the National Authority for 
Countering Terrorism, heads the Counter-Terrorism Operational Coordination Center  
 
 
                                                 
54 Razvan Ionescu and Liviu Muresan, Monitoring Exercise of Instruments and Mechanisms for 
Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector in Romania (Pilot project of the EURISC foundation, the 
Commission for Defense, Public Order and National Security of the House of Deputies – Parliament of 
Romania and with the support of the Geneva DCAF, 2004), 47. 
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(inter-agency body) and develops the National Strategy for Countering and Preventing 
Terrorism (approved by the CSAT).  Another of SRI’s primary duties is its fight against 
organized crime and trans-border risks (trafficking).55 
2. The Foreign Intelligence Service (SIE) 
The law stipulates that the mandate of the SIE includes the identification and 
countering of “political, economic, social, ecologic, and strategic factors originating from 
abroad, which threaten the national security of Romania.”56 
3. The Service for Protection and Guard (SPP) 
As prescribed by law, the SPP’s primary role is to protect and guard Romanian 
and foreign dignitaries on national territory.  However, the SPP is also allowed “to 
organize and carry out activities of gathering, checking and using necessary intelligence 
to fulfill its responsibilities.”57 
4. The Special Telecommunications Service (STS) 
The legal framework stipulates that the STS is the primary intelligence agency 
that focuses on special telecommunications.  Its role is “to administer, operate and 
develop […] and manage and ensure protection” of the special telecommunications 
networks.58 
5. The Defense General Directorate for Intelligence (DGIA) 
As part of the MoD, the responsibilities of the DGIA are approved by the Minister 
of Defense, within the legal framework stipulated for the MoD.  DGIA is the “specialized 
structure of the MoD responsible for the collection, processing, and verification of 
intelligence regarding internal and external, military and non-military risk factors to the 
national security.”59 It also manages intelligence with regard to the operational theaters 
where Romanian troops are deployed and is involved in WMD counter-proliferation. 
 
                                                 
55 For more details, Romanian Intelligence Service “Attributes and Responsibilities” (in Romanian). 
SRI available at http://www.sri.ro (last accessed: March 03, 2006). 
56 Ionescu and Muresan, 47-48. 
57 Ibid., 49. 
58 Ibid., 50. 
59 Cristian Troncotă, Security Policies, Strategies and Institutions (Bucharest: National Intelligence 
Academy course, 2004), 190-195. 
27 
6. The General Directorate for Intelligence and Internal Protection 
(DGIPI) 
DGIPI is the specialized intelligence agency of the Minister of Internal Affairs 
and Administration (MoI) and has the following legal responsibilities: collection and use 
of intelligence with regard to organized crime and political or social violence (riots), and 
counter-intelligence protection of the MoI personnel.  It is worth mentioning that the MoI 
also possesses an Intervention and Special Actions Service (as part of the General Police 
Inspectorate) which is designed to take direct actions against organized criminal 
groups.60 
A comparison of the Romanian case with the model built on theoretical grounds 
reveals that, in general, the mandate and functions of the Romanian intelligence agencies 
meet the democratic standards.  The major exception is the National Intelligence 
Community (Comunitatea Nationala de Informatii — CNI), which has not yet received 
the legal approval of Parliament (an aspect which will be addressed later).  Thus, a major 
priority of the intelligence reform process is to correct this deviation. 
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III. THE STRUCTURE OF INTELLIGENCE 
This chapter focuses on the various ways to organize intelligence and follows the 
same structure as the previous section.  First, it briefly presents the different academic 
perspectives on the issue and then it broaches the situation in Romania.  The main 
questions this section seeks to answer are:  How should the intelligence agencies be 
organized in a democracy?  How does structure affect the inter-agency cooperation, at 
one level, and the relationship between agencies and other state authorities, at another 
level? 
A. ORGANIZING INTELLIGENCE — THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Gill views the organization of the intelligence community as directly connected to 
the dimensions on which intelligence focuses.  Starting from the British model, he 
proposes an organizational structure divided into four main pillars: by the source of 
threat—intelligence can be foreign and domestic; by the specificity of threat—it can be 
economic, military, anti-terrorist or designed to address “political violence” and counter 
criminality; by objective (divided in two spheres)—it can be oriented towards gathering 
information (long-term strategic intelligence, short-term operational intelligence, case-
oriented crime intelligence) or towards countering intelligence (disruption/disinformation 
or arrest/prosecution).61 
Lowenthal uses the American model to build a functional organization of the 
intelligence community, based on the role played by various agencies.  He divides the 
intelligence agencies into several categories: managers/customers, collectors/builders, 
collectors and producers.62  Herman’s approach is more historical.  He looks back at the 
American and British experiences and notes how the need for intelligence progressed 
from purely military to diplomatic and internal (which implicitly requires military, 
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historical evolution: presently, the structure of the intelligence community reflects the 
needs of various governments for specialization in collection and assessment: foreign and 
internal security, geographic targets, and specific subjects.63 
To summarize, intelligence agencies may experience several minimal divisions: 
• Operational theater; e.g., domestic and abroad. 
• Issue-oriented (nature of threat); e.g., counter-terrorist, counter-
proliferation, against organized crime, military, and economic. 
• Functional; e.g., collectors, analysts, producers, and counter-intelligence. 
The separation of intelligence agencies then follows the distinct functions they 
fulfill.  Bruneau and Dombroski show that in the U.S., for example, counterintelligence 
and security intelligence are handled by the FBI, while the CIA deals with intelligence 
gathering and counterintelligence abroad.  Similarly, in Europe, most consolidated 
democracies have separate agencies that fulfill the various functions at home or abroad.  
However, Bruneau and Dombroski also note that the new democracies do not focus that 
much on this division, since their intelligence activities are mainly internal and foreign 
intelligence is quite expensive.  Finally, one of the main issues in the restructuring of the 
intelligence agencies in a new democratic regime is the problem of inter-agency 
coordination.  Bruneau and Dombroski link this specific issue to the broader relationship 
between intelligence and policy-makers and the regime factors and sub-factors.  The 
dilemma here is to choose between creating a central agency that coordinates all other 
agencies (e.g., the U.S.) or keeping separate, stand alone agencies (e.g., the UK).64  For 
example, Lowenthal favored the latest centralization in the U.S. intelligence system with 
the creation of a Director for National Intelligence, because it better integrated various 
U.S. intelligence agencies, limiting their duplication of effort as well as diminishing the 
risk of “internecine competition.”65 
To recap, the organization of the intelligence agencies should reflect the 
particularities of the political system within which they operate.  Agencies should be 
separated by function.  The main decision regarding the coordination of intelligence 
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agencies is the choice between creating a central body or maintaining separate agencies.  
However, a centralized system should include careful and thorough control as in the U.S., 
in order to “prevent any single entity from having a monopoly” on intelligence.66  In any 
case, the structure of the intelligence community must to be clear and open, in order to 
avoid creating confusion with regard to roles and responsibilities. 
B. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ROMANIAN INTELLIGENCE 
COMMUNITY 
The Romanian intelligence agencies hardly constitute an intelligence community 
in the real sense of the concept described by British scholar Zara Steiner: “harmonious 
interplay between agencies and government control” aiming at “an end to animosities 
[among various intelligence agencies], the establishment of friendly, productive 
relations.”67 
Whatever level of cooperation is achieved, it is done horizontally.  The National 
Supreme Defense Council (CSAT) may hardly be considered an authority that 
coordinates activities vertically, because it does not focus only on intelligence, but on all 
aspects of the security sector.  Its field of expertise is too broad.  This may be the reason 
behind the recent creation of another intelligence body.  The National Intelligence 
Community (Comunitatea Nationala de Informatii—CNI) was created by CSAT as a 
subordinated structure, at the proposal of the President of Romania.  Presently, however, 
it is supposed that a new package of laws regarding national security, which includes 
stipulations regarding CNI, is being debated in the Parliament, a subject of contention 
among various political parties. 
The decision of the CSAT stipulates the creation of a “functional network” that 
includes representatives from the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), the Foreign 
Intelligence Service (SIE), the Defense General Directorate for Intelligence (DGIA), and 
the General Directorate for Intelligence and Internal Protection (DGIPI).  The role of the 
CNI is to integrate and coordinate the intelligence process (request from consumers, and 
collection, and analysis, and dissemination of intelligence product).  Only the future will 
tell whether the CNI will increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the intelligence                                                  
66 Bruneau and Dombroski, 16. 
67 Zara Steiner, quoted in Thomas F. Troy, “The Quaintness of the U.S. Intelligence Community: Its 
Origin, Theory, and Problems,” in Johnson and Wirtz, 21-26. 
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community or whether the addition of another bureaucratic layer will lead to further 
inefficiency. Dombroski refers to this phenomenon (reforming the intelligence structure 
by adding bureaucratic layers) as the self-defeating repetitive pattern in organizational 
transformation (e.g., South Africa’s reform of the intelligence community).68 
 
 
Figure 4.   Problems of organizational transformation (From: Dombroski, Reforming 
Intelligence, 23) 
 
His argument is that reforming the structure of intelligence requires a certain 
amount of time to allow the agency to gradually adapt and recover efficiency.  Reforms 
do not have immediate effects.  In the case illustrated above, the policy-makers observe 
the drop in efficiency and attempt to correct it by initiating changes.  However, the short-
term effect of transforming structure is lower efficiency, since the new organization 
needs time to become functional.  If efficiency does not reach the desired level in a short 
time, policy-makers initiate another change in structure which implicitly leads to further 
efficiency loss and so on. 
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The Romanian intelligence community is characterized by a significant degree of 
fragmentation.  This fragmentation is a result of the need to tear down the former 
Securitate after the 1989 Revolution.69  The current intelligence system, as a 
consequence, duplicates tasks and activities, and encourages intense rivalry between 
different agencies for influence and resources, resulting in a lack of cooperation among 
themselves (i.e. the “stovepipe” problem).70 However, security intelligence is clearly 
differentiated from law enforcement agencies, the military and foreign intelligence 
structures. 
The Romanian intelligence agencies are divided as follows. 
1. Operational (Territory where Intelligence Agencies Conduct Their 
Activities 
(1)   SRI: domestic 
(2)   SIE: foreign 
(3)   SPP: mixed, but mainly domestic (it may accompany Romanian 
dignitaries abroad) 
(4)   STS: mainly domestic 
(5)   DGIA: mixed (it assesses domestic military and political-military threats, 
but it also gathers and analyzes intelligence from the operational theaters 
where Romanian troops are deployed, as well as from military attaches in 
Romanian diplomatic missions) 
(6)   DGIPI: domestic 
2. Issue Oriented 
(1)   SRI: multi-dimensional  
(2)   SIE: multi-dimensional  
(3)   SPP: mainly related to protection of dignitaries 
(4)   STS: mainly SIGINT (or COMINT, a subset of SIGINT) 
(5)   DGIA: mainly military and political-military 
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3. Functional 
(1)   SRI: all-inclusive 
(2)   SIE: all-inclusive (except counter intelligence) 
(3)   SPP: collectors/analysts 
(4)   STS: collectors/analysts and counter-intelligence 
(5)   DGIA: all-inclusive 
(6)   DGIPI: all-inclusive 
To conclude, Romanian intelligence agencies do not benefit from a clear 
structure.  The lines that are supposed to separate their roles, functions and operational 
areas are quite blurred.  Strictly in terms of organization, Romania seems to be closer to 
the British model with its autonomous agencies, but because Romania does not benefit 
from the same regime/sub-regime factors as Britain (Romania’s political stage is more 
confrontational and less collegial), the result is not the same in terms of efficiency and 
control (there is duplication of functions, less cooperation, and responsibilities are so 
intermingled it is difficult to assess who has done what).  However, the present attempts 
at reform indicate the will to correct these problems.  Eliminating some agencies (and 
thus duplication of roles, as with the intelligence agency of the Minister of Justice) and 
by creating a central authority (probably following the U.S. example, creating the CNI), 
Romania may move forward on the right path.  Nevertheless, centralization of 
intelligence should be accompanied by an analysis of the control mechanisms, in order to 
eliminate the risk of a single entity monopolizing intelligence. 
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IV. THE CONTROL OF INTELLIGENCE 
This chapter addresses the sensitive issue of the control of intelligence in a 
democracy.71  The first section is dedicated to the theoretical framework, while the 
second presents the Romanian case.  The questions to be answered are: Who should exert 
control and oversight over intelligence agencies and to what extent? What are the 
consequences of too much/too little accountability? 
A. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE CONTROL AND OVERSIGHT 
OF INTELLIGENCE 
Gill reviews a number of control and oversight mechanisms needed to prevent 
abuses of power by the intelligence agencies.  He proposes four levels of control and 
oversight: the first is exerted by the intelligence agency itself; the second is applied by 
the overall executive branch; the third is employed by other state bodies such as the 
legislative or the judicial branch; finally, the fourth is executed by civil society itself.72  
Lowenthal considers control and oversight as one of the most enduring and complex 
challenges regarding intelligence: “Sed quis custodiet ipso custodies? (But who will 
guard the guards?).”73  He assesses the difficulties of controlling and overseeing 
intelligence by two main actors in the process: the executive and the legislative branches.  
Bruneau and Dombroski consider that “Within the realm of civilian control of the armed 
forces as a subset of civil-military relations, probably the most problematic issue is 
control of the intelligence services.”74  They note the intrinsic clash of values between a 
democracy based on accountability and transparency and the secrecy-oriented 
intelligence community.  Moreover, they maintain that the success of the democratic 
consolidation process is determined by the degree of control and oversight of the 
intelligence agencies.  They also link aspects of structure and control by stating that “A 
common mechanism to control intelligence is by separating it into different agencies, to 
                                                 
71 As already stated in the introduction, control refers to the process of managing and supervising 
intelligence, while oversight refers to monitoring intelligence.  However, for the sake of simplification, this 
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72 Gill, 248-311. 
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74 Bruneau and Dombroski, 1. 
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prevent any single entity from having a monopoly on its production or use.”  They also 
emphasize the need for an external type of control and oversight (legislative, judicial, 
public), since self-monitoring (by the executive or agency itself) may be biased, and how 
to assess its value.75 
Bruneau proposes an interesting trinity: control–effectiveness–efficiency.76  His 
argument states that the three concepts are positioned in a triangular relationship to form 
the institutional basis for achieving civil–military relations.  However, in the intelligence 
field, only the first two elements of the trinity are maintained, because there is civilian 
and democratic control over intelligence is consolidated and because politicians have a 
vested interest in the success (effectiveness) of the intelligence agencies and their 
product.  Bruneau also concludes that there is little attention paid to the efficiency of the 
intelligence community, in part due to the secret nature of the budgets of intelligence 
agencies. 
Maior and Huluban make an important note that the “overseers” and “controllers” 
should transform at the same time as the intelligence agencies themselves.  They argue 
that “You cannot understand the dimension of required transformation as long as you do 
not transform yourself.  In other words, you cannot properly oversee the dynamics as 
long as your overseeing position is static and, unfortunately, many times rigid.”77  This 
aspect relates back to the relationship between intelligence and policy-makers and points 
to the incentives and expertise that politicians have in order to get involved into 
intelligence matters. 
1. Legislative Control 
In addition to being a separate entity from the intelligence community, the 
legislative body (or Parliament) is also the most representative institution in a democracy 
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have free and fair elections, the power rests with the people, and they deliberately 
delegate that power to the branches of government.  A legislative body ensures a 
“dependence on the people,” in Johnson’s terms.78 
The “citizens of a democracy […] rely on government policy-making institutions 
controlled by elected officials.”79 These elected officials are the members of the 
Parliament.  The major trait of democracies is then the fact that rulers “are held 
accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the 
competition and cooperation of their elected representatives.”80 
It seems clear then that the legislative body plays a key role in the functioning of a 
democracy, and implicitly, in regulating intelligence activities.  The parliamentary check 
on intelligence is part of the larger system of checks and balances between legislative and 
executive powers, protected by the principle of separation and balance of powers (also 
known as “sharing of power between separate institutions”).81 
Some of Giraldo’s conclusions regarding the role of legislatures in defense issues 
are also valid for intelligence.82  The need for legislative participation in the intelligence 
realm is motivated by the goal to increase: the accountability of the intelligence 
community, to maintain the quality of the policy, and to ensure the transparency and 
legitimacy of the policy (and consequently the stability of policy).  Legislative 
participation may also help to prevent or correct executive/intelligence misbehavior.  
However, the legislature may also delay the decision–making process (as Giraldo put it, 
“time-consuming”) and this may be the reason most countries have constitutional or legal 
stipulations that decrease the role of legislatures in times of emergency, crisis, or war, 
when the need for action is immediate.  Legislative control may also decrease intelligence 
efficiency and effectiveness.  Policy quality is also doubtful, especially when the 
obtaining the approval of several parties within Parliament requires huge compromises. 
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Legislative responsibilities regarding intelligence and military issues may be 
categorized as general powers—to “make and oversee budgets, decisions, laws and 
policies,” and specific powers—related to “procurement, deployment of troops [covert 
operations, in the case of intelligence], defense and security policy planning, personnel 
management and approval of international treaties related to defense [intelligence 
cooperation in this case].”  General powers are exercised during both the formulation 
stage (control—direct impact) and implementation stage (oversight—indirect impact) of 
laws, decisions, budgets, and policies.  Oversight is about holding the executive and the 
intelligence community accountable and checking whether laws have the desired result or 
outcome, and works through the so-called “police patrols” and “fire alarms”(he latter are 
less effective in the intelligence realm due to the lack of strong NGOs or other think-
tanks).83 
There is little consensus regarding what the legislative powers should be and 
Giraldo summarizes the options as: “no best practices,” “informed expert,” informed 
expert plus core powers,” and “ideal type.”  The first is self-evident, there is no magic 
formula and every country has a different model.  The second refers to the access to 
information by the legislature and to its need for expertise (usually materialized in an 
intelligence committee).  The third includes some “must-have” powers, such as 
budgeting, appointment/approval of intelligence officials and deployment of troops.  The 
last alternative supports the idea that maximum influence equals maximum benefits 
(“informed expert plus full range of powers”).  Building on Giraldo’s arguments, it can 
be said that intelligence committees are the key to better legislative control and oversight 
over intelligence and the executive branch.  She notes the difficulties in accessing 
information (the intelligence realm is characterized by a high level of secrecy) and 
obtaining expertise (lack of qualified personnel with a grasp on intelligence issues and 





                                                 
83 Giraldo, ch. 2., 35-38. 
39 
 the ability of the legislature to solicit and access information and to acquire specialized 
staff.84  Secrecy is also the reason the budgeting function of Parliament is more focused 
on “spending levels not spending choices,” as Giraldo put it.85 
Finally, regulating intelligence can be approached in two ways: “routine, 
systematic surveillance (‘police patrols’)” or “enquiry only after learning of misdeeds 
(‘fire alarms’).” Regulation can also be organized around two variables: participation (the 
number of legislative bodies involved in intelligence oversight—chambers, committees, 
commissions etc.), which subsequently leads to a differentiation between multilateral and 
unilateral oversight; and the means to oversee intelligence, distinguished by personal  
oversight (when done by individuals nominated on the basis of trust and leadership) and 
constitutional oversight (when appointment is the responsibility of the elected bodies).86 
2. Executive Control 
As the DCAF researcher Marina Caparini puts it, “Executive oversight generally 
concerns itself with issues of efficacy of the intelligence services; questioning whether 
the intelligence services are functioning efficiently and carrying out their assigned 
tasks.”87 Decision-makers should verify whether intelligence actions are carried out in 
accordance with their orders.88 
Executive control refers to the control exercised by the executive body, other than 
the intelligence agencies themselves.  Executive control usually has several functions: 
• Involvement in the elaboration of the mandate and statute of the 
intelligence agencies (through governmental decisions, ordinances and 
emergency ordinances). 
• Projection of the budget levels and allocations (synonymous with a closer 
implication in spending choices, as opposed to the legislative).  The 
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executive usually goes through a complex internal and inter-agency 
process of deliberation and negotiation regarding the finances fixed for 
every intelligence agency.  It is then approved, or not, by Parliament. 
• Monitoring intelligence activities through inspectors and other similar 
institutional arrangements. 
There is an ongoing debate over the appropriate level of control exercised by 
executive bodies.  Too much oversight is considered an infringement on the effectiveness 
of the intelligence community, transforming it into a “sclerotic bureaucracy,” due to the 
“near endless briefings that nibble to death” intelligence officials.”89 
It is worth mentioning that legislative and executive control are highly influenced 
by the broader relationship between these two entities.90  If the legislators are too 
executive-minded, rarely questioning executive actions, legislative control may be 
labeled superficial and not producing the desired outcome.  On the other hand, if the 
legislative-executive relationship is characterized by tensions and discord, too much 
control might not allow the intelligence agencies to perform their duties.  As Lowenthal 
puts it, “The oversight system is, of necessity, adversarial but not necessarily hostile.  
Any system that divides power [separation of powers] is bound to have debates and 
friction.  But they do not have to be played out in an antagonistic manner.  When 
antagonism arises, it is more often the effect of personalities, issues, and partisanship 
[Giraldo’s sub-regime factors] rather than the oversight system per se.”91 
3. Other Types of Control 
Judicial control is about issues of propriety, in Caparini’s terms, since it deals 
with the legality of intelligence activities (like verifying the constitutionality of the laws 
concerning intelligence or prosecuting intelligence abuses).  Although it seems quite 
limited, because it does not have a direct effect on intelligence policy, judicial control is 
considered a form of “anticipatory control.”92  In other words, intelligence professionals 
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may restrain themselves from violation of the legal framework or of the rights/liberties 
stipulated by the constitution, because they know they will later be subject to judicial 
control.  However, this assumes two probable conditions. First, that intelligence agencies 
make a rational calculation (gains may be lower if laws are broken); second, that 
intelligence agencies believe there is a higher probability of their actions being revealed. 
Frederic Manget, an American intelligence official and scholar, says that U.S. 
judges “interpret the laws that affect national security to reach compromises necessary to 
reconcile the open world of American jurisprudence and the closed world of intelligence 
operations.”93 However, Larry Watts, a U.S. consultant to Romanian Government on 
SSR issues, notes that “judicial oversight is generally limited in practice to the 
consideration and issuing of warrants for technical surveillance that infringe on civil 
rights and liberties.  By requiring the approval of judicial authorities—whether judicial 
commissioners, prosecutors, or judges—a pre–emptive control is established.”94  As 
with the relationship between the legislative and executive branches, judicial control is 
influenced by its interaction with the other two branches. However, the most relevant 
aspect of this relationship is the independence of the judges vis-à-vis the legislative and, 
especially, the executive. 
There is also internal control, which refers to intelligence controlling itself, and 
consists of the “selection, training and overall preparation of the intelligence 
professionals,”95 as well as the mechanisms that regulate the internal affairs of an agency.  
To be more specific, there are incentives that the employees themselves have (as a result 
of education and training) to refrain themselves from abusing or misusing intelligence.  
The existence of a director (management), inspector (monitoring) and an internal set of 
rules also help to prevent employees from abusing or misusing intelligence.  Finally, 
there is external control, exercised by the civil society (NGOs) and the media.  This type  
 
                                                 
93 Frederic F. Manget, “Another System of Oversight: Intelligence and the Rise of Judicial 
Intervention” in Johnson and Wirtz, 407. 
94 Larry Watts, “Control and Oversight of Security Intelligence in Romania,” DCAF Working Paper 
no. 111, Geneva 2003, 15, available at www.dcaf.ch/pcaf/ev_geneva_021002_prog_watts.pdf (last 
accessed: March 13, 2006). 
95 Bruneau in Johnson and Wirtz, 450.  This type of control is closely connected to the 
professionalization issue and it will be addressed in the next chapter. 
42 
of control refers mainly to the actions performed by civil society actors (newspapers, 
interest groups, civil liberties advocates, and individual citizens) in order “to expose 
security intelligence transgressions and to prevent their recurrence.”96 
B. CONTROL OF THE ROMANIAN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES 
The control of the Romanian intelligence agencies is carefully stipulated in a solid 
legal framework (including the Romanian Constitution).  The main actors which exert 
this control are the legislative and the executive bodies.  However, other types of control, 
such as judicial or public, are also noteworthy. 
1. Legislative 
Parliament builds the legal framework within which intelligence agencies operate.  
Parliamentary control is translated into laws that created the intelligence agencies, 
establishing their mandate and statute. 
First, Parliament adopts and/or amends laws that specify the functions of the 
National Supreme Defense Council (CSAT), the most important executive body that 
coordinates, organizes and directs activities in the security sector.  It is a structure created 
through constitutional provisions, which were approved by referendum, chaired by the 
President of Romania, vice-chaired by the Prime-Minister, and comprises all executive 
bodies with responsibilities in the security sector.  Parliament also adopts/amends two 
fundamental laws in the field of intelligence: Law on National Security (51/1991) and 
Law on the Protection of Classified Information (182/2002). 
Second, the Parliament adopts and/or amends the statutory laws of the 
autonomous intelligence agencies, specifying their missions, roles and their overall 
organizational charts.  Departmental agencies are regulated through laws that define the 
activity of the broader executive structures to which they belong.97 
Parliament also prioritizes the intelligence agenda by adopting and approving 
essential strategic documents, such as the National Security Strategy.  It is also worth 
mentioning that the head of the SRI (the largest intelligence agency, in quantitative 
                                                 
96 Williams, “Introduction” in Williams and Deletant, 8-9. 
97 Ionescu and Muresan, 41-51. 
43 
terms) must be approved by the two chambers of Parliament (House of Deputies and 
Senate), after presidential recommendation. 
Yet, there is no parliamentary stipulation regarding the most recent intelligence 
agency (the National Intelligence Community — CNI).  The CNI was initiated by the 
President and created through a decision of the CSAT, as an analysis unit (and is itself a 
part of the CSAT).  Until now, the CNI has avoided any form of legislative control or 
oversight.  It includes members from several executive bodies and is supposed to 
coordinate and integrate the information provided by all other intelligence agencies.  It 
will probably be headed by a politician named by the President and approved by the 
CSAT, and is operatively directed by the presidential adviser on national security (who is 
the former head of the military intelligence). 
Budgeting is also a responsibility of Parliament (as mentioned previously, this 
budgetary function focuses on budget levels, not budget allocations).  Finally, the 
legislative exerts its fundamental control through the annual adoption and/or revision of 
the Law on State Budget.  The following tables present a comparison of the budgets of 
Romanian intelligence agencies.98  They reflect both the size of each agency as well as 
their importance in the eyes of policy-makers.  
The budgets of the intelligence agencies are transparent (with the exception of the 
DGIPI) and tend to be approximately 3.3 percent of the state budget (and possibly as 
much as 3.6-3.7 percent, when including estimations regarding the budget of DGIPI).  It 
is also worth mentioning that SRI and STS are able to significantly increase their budgets 
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Table 2. Budgetary levels for Romanian intelligence agencies in 2005 (From: Law of State 
Budget for 2005, available at the website of the Romanian Minister of Finances) 
 
 Allocation from State Budget 
(million USD) 
Total budgets including extra-










Table 3. Budgetary levels for intelligence agencies in 2006 (From: Law of State Budget for 
2006, available at the website of the Romanian Minister of Finances) 
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(million USD) 
Total budgets including extra-












Figure 5.   Budgets of intelligence agencies as percentages of the State Budget in 
2005  (From: Law of State Budget for 2005, available at the website of the 
Romanian Minister of Finances) 
 








































Figure 6.   Budgets of intelligence agencies as percentages of the State Budget in 
2006  (From: Law of State Budget for 2006, available at the website of the 
Romanian Minister of Finances) 
 
All the methods mentioned above function as pro-active legislative control (ab 
initio).  It can also be argued that they also function as active control (simultaneous) 
because of the law amendment and the budget review prerogatives of the Parliament. 
Parliament also has reactive powers (legislative oversight), allowing the 
monitoring of the intelligence community.  Parliament makes use of the following as part 
of this function.99 
• Reports—Parliament requires reviews of the executive/intelligence 
activity. 
• Questions—similar to reports, but on more concrete aspects. 
• Interpellations—Parliament requires justification of certain 
activities/policies. 
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• Investigations— the Executive is obliged to allow legislative active 
inspections. 
• Simple motions—Parliament issues statements on a specific problem, 
which act as a kind of warning to the government (including intelligence) 
• Censorship motions—Parliament states its opposition to a certain 
policy/activity, it may result in a weakened Executive (or the government 
may “behead” chiefs of intelligence in order to restore its image). 
The key legislative bodies that exert parliamentary control, as argued by Giraldo, 
are the specialized committees.  Each chamber of Parliament has its own permanent 
Commission for Defense, Public Order and National Security, to which all intelligence 
agencies are accountable.  Moreover, the most important autonomous agencies, SRI and 
SIE, are each monitored through a Joint Standing Committee for Exercising 
Parliamentary Control of SRI, and respectively SIE (committees of both Senate and 
Chamber of Deputies). 
Currently, the House of Deputies’ Commission for Defense, Public Order and 
National Security includes 24 members, out of which the governing coalition has a total 
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UDMR PSD (1 vice-chair) PRM (1 vice-chair)
Minorities Total gov't coalition Total opposition
 
Figure 7.   Distribution of seats in the Commission for Defense, Public Order and 
National Security of the Romanian House of Deputies (From: Website of 
Romanian Chamber of Deputies)100 
 
The abbreviations correspond to the following political parties: PD—Democratic 
Party (Partidul Democrat); PNL—Liberal Party (Partidul National Liberal); PC—
Conservative Party (Partidul Conservator); UDMR—Hungarian Democratic Union 
(Uniunea Democrata a Maghiarilor din Romania); PSD—Partidul Social-Democrat 
(Social-Democratic Party); PRM—Greater Romania Party (Partidul Romania Mare). 
The homologue commission from the Senate has a total of 11 seats, out of which 
the governing coalition has six, and the opposition has five (including one independent 
seat of a former member of the PSD). 
                                                 
100 Source: Romanian Chamber of Deputies. Committees Structure. Chamber of Deputies, available at 


















PD PNL (1 vice-chair) PC
UDMR PSD (1 chair) PRM (1 vice-chair)
Minorities Total gov't coalition Total opposition
 
Figure 8.   Distribution of seats in the Commission for Defense, Public Order and 
National Security of the Romanian Senate (From: Website of Romanian Chamber 
of Deputies)101 
 
Both commissions include members with experience in the intelligence field, such 
as retired senior officers (the former Chief of the General Staff of the Romanian Armed 
Forces to which the DGIA was subordinated), former ministers and high officials. 
The Joint Standing Committee for the Control of SRI includes nine members of 
both chambers of the Parliament.  The governing coalition has five seats, while the 
opposition has four. 
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PD PNL (1 chair) PC UDMR (1 vice-chair)
PSD PRM Total gov't coalition Total opposition
 
Figure 9.   Distribution of seats in the Joint Standing Committee of the Romanian 
Parliament for the Control of SRI (From: Website of Romanian Chamber of 
Deputies)102  
 
The Joint Standing Committee for the Control of SIE has five members, out of 
which the governing coalition has two seats, and the opposition has three. 
 
                                                 
102 Source: Romanian Chamber of Deputies. Committees Structure. Chamber of Deputies, available at 
http://www.cdep.ro/pls/parlam/structura.co?leg=2004&cam=0&idc=15&poz=0&idl=1 (last accessed: 
















PD (1 chair) PNL PSD (1 vice-chair) PRM Total gov't coalition Total opposition
 
Figure 10.   Distribution of seats in the Joint Standing Committee of the Romanian 
Parliament for the Control of SIE  (From: Website of Romanian Chamber of 
Deputies)103  
 
These graphs demonstrate how balanced the representation of different political 
parties is in these committees.  Without an adequate presence of the opposition, the 
parliamentarians of the governing coalition would have fewer incentives to check on their 
colleagues in the government (this is a peculiarity of the Romanian political system—a 
sub-factor as Giraldo might have called it: ministries and important members of the 
executive are usually also members of Parliament or have support from their party  
 
 
                                                 
103 Source: Romanian Chamber of Deputies. Committees Structure. Chamber of Deputies, available at 
http://www.cdep.ro/pls/parlam/structura.co?leg=2004&cam=0&idc=21&poz=0&idl=1 (last accessed: 
March 13, 2006) 
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colleagues).  A major presence of the opposition in these committees also decreases the 
risk of politicization, since the activity of intelligence is checked by all parties 
represented in the Parliament. 
2. Executive 
In Romania, the supreme executive institution that exerts control over intelligence 
is the National Supreme Defense Council (CSAT), a specialized central body that 
organizes and coordinates all intelligence activities.  The CSAT itself is subject to 
parliamentary control.104  Its prerogatives include the analysis and endorsement of the 
National Security Strategy, the Military Strategy, as well as data, information, and reports 
submitted by the intelligence agencies.  It also approves the bills of the government with 
regard to national security and budget allocation for the agencies with responsibilities in 
the field of security.105  Besides the President and Prime-Minister of Romania (chairman 
and vice-chairman, respectively), the members of the CSAT include: the Minister of 
National Defense, the Minister of Administration and Internal Affairs, the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Industry and Resources, the 
Minister of Public Finances, the Director of the SRI, the Director of the SIE, the Chief of 
the General Staff of the Romanian Armed Forces, and the Presidential Adviser on 
National Security.  Upon invitation by the President of Romania, the chairmen of the two 
parliamentary chambers, the governor of the National Bank, the heads of the other 
intelligence agencies (including the departmental ones), and the chairmen of the 
parliamentary specialized committees may participate in CSAT meetings.106 
Another relevant institution is the Office of the National Registry for State Secret 
Information (Oficiul Registrului National al Informatiilor Secrete de Stat—ORNISS), 
created as part of Romania’s NATO accession process (emphasizing once again the 
relevance of the international community in security sector reform, including civilian 
control of intelligence).  ORNISS is the central authority in the field of classified 
information protection and its most important attribute is issuing security clearances. 
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The departmental intelligence agencies are subject to more thorough executive 
control, being part of larger institutions (Minister of Defense and Minister of Internal 
Affairs).  The control of the defense and internal affairs ministries over their own 
intelligence units is valuable especially in terms of budgetary execution (how the funds 
are spent) and verification of conformity between the intelligence activity and the 
requests of the policy-makers.107 
The autonomous agencies are less controlled, since they are subordinated to the 
CSAT, which includes the agencies’ top officials (heads of SRI and SIE are members of 
CSAT).  This is another Romanian peculiarity which raises doubts regarding the 
accountability of SRI and SIE, since they are part of the institution to which they are 
accountable. 
3. Other Types of Control 
In Romania, judicial control is exercised by the Constitutional Court (which 
makes decisions on issues of constitutionality), the Attorney General (who conducts 
investigations and prosecutes) and other courts of justice (which determine non-
compliance with the law).  Reactive control is exercised when third parties file a suit 
against abuses committed by the intelligence agencies.108  The warrants requested by 
intelligence agencies have to be approved by the General Prosecutors’ office.  These 
warrants must be carefully elaborated in terms of motivation (threat to national security), 
use (category of activities allowed by the warrant; e.g., wiretapping), target (identity of 
the persons monitored by the intelligence agencies), location (where the activities will be 
carried out), duration (how long the activities will be carried out) and actor (what 
intelligence unit will perform those activities).  In general, judicial authorities are “not 
known for high rates of refusal” when warrants are requested.109 
Internal control refers to the capacity of each agency for self-policing and the 
Romanian intelligence agencies possess specialized bodies (ad-hoc investigative 
committees, audit structures) whose main objective is to monitor the activity of 
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intelligence officers during the intelligence cycle.  Internal control is also related to 
intelligence training and education programs, but this will be addressed in the chapter 
dedicated to professionalization. 
When it comes to external control, one of the most relevant institutions is the 
National Council for the Research of Securitate Archives (Consiliul National pentru 
Studierea Arhivelor Securitatii—CNSAS).  It is a non-governmental body but its 
members are elected by the legislative body in order to ensure its objectivity (the elected 
member are scholars, not official members of political parties).  The CNSAS may be 
considered as a ‘watchdog’ hired by the Parliament.  Its main function is to ensure access 
to archives of the former Securitate (to ensure transparency), but its powers are limited by 
a veto of the executive (which considers some documents to still be classified).  In 
addition, the Romanian media plays an active role in monitoring domestic intelligence 
activity.110  According to Matei, a Romanian researcher at the Naval Postgraduate 
School, “The press and civil society have held the government and intelligence services 
to very high standards regarding democratic control, transparency, and requirements for 
European and Euro-Atlantic integration.”  Through its criticism of the intelligence 
structure, the media put pressure on the executive to investigate intelligence abuses, 
speed up intelligence reforms and even forced the legislature to adopt/amend laws.  Matei 
describes the relationship between intelligence and the media as “tense and symbiotic,” in 
the sense that there is discord in the interests of the two sides (the news does not 
correspond to the official views of the government), but also convergence (the media 
needs a “story,” the intelligence needs “good publicity”).111  On the other hand, the role 
of the media is not always positive, because of a large penetration in the media of former 
Securitate officers which used it for “deception, disinformation, and blackmail.”112 
In conclusion, legislative control of the intelligence in Romania can be estimated 
on a low-medium-high scale as “medium to high.”  Budgetary levels are transparent; the 
activity of the intelligence agencies is monitored by specialized committees; members of 
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those committees have expertise in intelligence matters; and Parliament approves the 
legal framework within which intelligence agencies operate and which establishes their 
roles and responsibilities. 
Executive control in Romania can also be considered “medium to high.”  
Theoretically, intelligence is strictly subordinated to the executive bodies and therefore 
executive control could normally be considered high.  However, given the specificity of 
CSAT and the reluctance of the executive bodies to fully assume intelligence control (to 
be able to use the “plausible deniability” principle or simply because they fear the power 
that intelligence has because of access to information), it is more realistic to consider 
executive control to be less than high.  Moreover, if we include the creation of the CNI, a 
much debated issue in Romania, we have what seems to be an anomaly to this system of 
medium to high executive control.  The CNI is a body that is practically subordinated to 
the President, is not established by a law approved by the Parliament, is not subject to 
Parliament control and has an autonomous budget (decided only by CSAT). 
Judicial control can be labeled “low” because of its reactive nature.  The 
speculations that the future powers of intelligence agencies will interfere with the 
judiciary are also indicators of the judiciary’s weakness when it comes to control over 
intelligence agencies.  Watts also mentions the “vulnerability of the legal system, 
particularly in the poor enforcement of existing laws and constitutional provisions.”113  
External control can be considered as “medium.”  The media is quite successful in 
being watchful over intelligence activities and several authors have emphasized the 
vigilance of the media when reporting intelligence abuses.114 NGOs are also active in the 
field of civil liberties and human rights when it comes to the activity of intelligence 
agencies. 
There is “medium” internal control because of the “low level of 
professionalization” noted by Watts.  However, the author also points to the “capacity of 
self-policing” of the intelligence agencies.115 
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Table 4. Estimates regarding levels of control of intelligence in Romania 
 
Authority Level of control 
Legislative Medium to High 






V. THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE 
This chapter attempts to define intelligence as a profession and identify its main 
characteristics.  It also discusses personnel policies in the intelligence field (recruitment, 
education, and training).  The first section briefly outlines the academic debate, while the 
second deals with Romania specifically.  The main questions to be answered are: Is 
intelligence distinguishable as a profession?  Does it fit into a democratic milieu?  What 
are the implications of recruitment, training and education? 
A. INTELLIGENCE AS PROFESSION.  A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 
There is little literature on intelligence as a profession.  It may be useful to 
translate the model of Samuel Huntington, a famous American political scientist and 
approach intelligence in terms of expertise, responsibility and corporateness.116  Bruneau 
builds the case of an “intelligence profession,” on Huntingtonian grounds.117  Intelligence 
as a profession is thus defined in terms of expertise (handling of secrets), corporateness 
(access to secrets) and responsibility (to the state).  However, Bruneau notices the 
contradictions within this equation.  An organization that evolves around secrecy tends to 
become self-governing and self-accountable and less inclined to be controlled or 
overseen by an external body. 
Bruneau and Dombroski also note that the most prominent feature of 
intelligence—secrecy— has direct implications in two of the three elements in this 
equation.  The emphasis on secrecy leads to intelligence as a profession “largely 
governing itself.”  It is therefore a major task of the democratic leaders “to inculcate a 
sense of professional responsibility by making intelligence officers and agencies 
answerable to the state.”118  This is what professionalization means, and it can be 
achieved by transforming the intelligence bureaucracy through attentive recruitment, 
education and training.  
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Bruneau and Boraz approach the same Huntingtonian model and suggest 
measures that would improve the professionalization of intelligence: attempting to 
“promote and inculcate a sense of professional responsibility by making intelligence 
officers and agencies accountable to the state via the democratically elected leaders” and 
by recruiting and training civilians for future positions within the intelligence 
agencies.119  Maior and Huluban emphasize the importance of training and education, 
since they see the transformation of intelligence as “transforming attitudes rather than just 
transforming/re-transforming organizational charts.”120  Following this argument, it 
results that careful attention should be paid to the mentalities and values that predominate 
in the intelligence field and not only to concrete aspects such as the structure of 
intelligence or control mechanisms. 
Marrin and Clemente make an interesting comparison between medicine and 
intelligence analysis, which they consider to be both craft and profession—they require 
“both a practical skill set and academic preparation.”121  Similarly, Maior and Huluban 
believe that intelligence may be built as profession using other models.  However, they 
insist that the “model” should come from fields that are “neighboring the intelligence 
zone in terms of predicting the future out of intangible factors and hard-to-quantify 
variables,” such as political science, international relations and even philosophy.122  
Intelligence agencies could only benefit from the presence of civilians with such a 
background in their structure. 
Michael Handel argues that the professional integrity of the intelligence 
community is influenced by a number of factors, such as the quality of training and 
education, the extent to which self-criticism is encouraged within the organization, or 
career planning (e.g., favoritism or meritocracy).  Additionally, he mentions the inherent  
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traits of intelligence that alter its ideal, rational behavior: military patterns of thought (too 
rigid and direct for intelligence analysis), organizational parochialism (restricted access 
in the intelligence milieu) and excessive secrecy.123 
In summary, as a profession, intelligence is mainly characterized by secrecy.  In 
order to counterweigh this aspect, two major efforts are needed: first—the inducement of 
a democratic ethos and an ethic of responsibility to the state and of serving the public 
interest, consisting of preserving human rights and civil liberties; and second—the 
“rapprochement” of intelligence with the civilian sphere, by the inclusion of more 
civilians in the system.  Both of these traits are the direct result of the recruitment, 
training and education policies. 
B. PROFESSIONALIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE IN ROMANIA 
In Romania, the education/training/recruitment process takes place within the 
intelligence community itself.  The main “personnel pool” for the major intelligence 
agency, in terms of personnel—the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI)—is the National 
Intelligence Academy.  The General Directorate for Intelligence and Internal Protection 
(DGIPI) and the Defense General Directorate for Intelligence (DGIA) also have some 
separate and autonomous educational establishments within the Police Academy and the 
Military Academy, respectively.  The National Defense University and the Superior 
College of National Security are superior academic centers that also include intelligence 
in their curricula.  Some of these intelligence educational institutions recruit civilians 
(both as students and instructors) and have ties to numerous domestic NGOs (EURISC, 
Pro Democratia Association) and other establishments (Center for Civil-Military Relation 
of the Naval Postgraduate School— Monterey; and Center for Democratic Control of the 
Armed Forces—Geneva). 
However, most of the intelligence agencies have more transparent and open 
programs of recruitment (job opportunities on websites and in the media, available to 
civilians) that attract civilians into the intelligence system. 
A major step toward the recruitment of civilians may be taken once Parliament 
passes a law regarding the de-militarization of SRI and SIE (currently under debate).  The 
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present intelligence officers will become civil servants with special status and only some 
specialized units will remain military.  Intelligence civilians, rather than military, might 
better interact with other civilian structures of the government and with civil society.  As 
Handel put it, they become free of some patterns of military thought (rigid, hierarchical, 
and direct) which are less suited for analysis.  Additionally, civilians from the other 
branches of the government and the general public may perceive them closer, not 
separated by the mental limits that distinguish uniforms from the rest.  In short, the status 
of the intelligence analysts within the state and society may change once they become 
part of the civil function of the government and not of the military.  This evolution may 
also draw a more distinct line between military intelligence (MoD) and the other 
intelligence agencies.  As civilian servants, intelligence personnel would benefit from a 




A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Due to the multitude of particularities that characterize each democracy in its 
unique context, there is no universally accepted solution on how to manage the 
intelligence process.  However, some traits are considered to be essential in any 
discussion regarding intelligence reforms in a democracy.  A dialectical style is be 
appropriate when arguing for the balance of these values: freedom vs. security, 
transparency vs. secrecy, centralization vs. fragmentation of the intelligence community, 
and legislative vs. executive control over intelligence.  In order to adapt to new 
circumstances (counter asymmetric risks and consolidation of democracy), an 
organizational transformation of intelligence is rather difficult and not always sufficient. 
Due to the complex interaction of the intelligence system with both state and society, 
attempts to reform it should encompass not only the intelligence community itself, but its 
relationship with the politicians and the people, and especially their mutual perceptions of 
each other (how the policy-makers and civil society view and implicitly control 
intelligence).  And this is an endless process.  Even in a consolidated democracy, 
managing intelligence remains problematic.  As an example, in the post 9/11 era, the U.S. 
engaged in a profound transformation of its intelligence community.  In a new 
democracy, the difficulties of reforming intelligence are magnified because of the dual 
transformation process mentioned in the introduction. 
In order to summarize the findings, democratization of the intelligence system 
would require changes in the mandate, structure, control and professionalization of 
intelligence.  
In terms of mandate, democratization of intelligence would mean a clear and 
limited role, stipulated in legal texts approved by all three state powers (issued by the 
executive, approved by the legislative and constitutionally sanctioned by the judiciary), 
with the consent of the civil society (public debates, both academic and in the media), 
and the respect of human rights and civil liberties, as promoted by liberal 
constitutionalism and enshrined in the rule of law. 
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In terms of structure, democratization means openness of the various intelligence 
agencies.  Their organization should clarify individual mandates, thus preventing an 
overlapping of responsibilities or duplication of functions.  Overlapping allows the 
concealment of abuses and is synonymous with vague responsibilities (intelligence 
agencies may pass the blame on to each other). 
When it comes to control, democratization means more control of intelligence 
agencies and more transparency of the intelligence cycle.  The most important overseer in 
a democracy seems to be the legislative body, since it is the most representative state 
power.  However, the judicial body is the one that controls the legality of actions and thus 
the respect of the rule of law.  The civil society should also be more involved in the 
process, through academia, the media and NGOs.  Finally, the executive body and the 
intelligence agencies themselves must increase their control and oversight. 
In terms of professionalization, democratization signifies the transformation of the 
recruitment/training/education process for intelligence officers and the promotion of 
democratic values in the spirit of intelligence as a profession.  More attention should be 
given to the inclusion of civilians in the intelligence spheres. 
Nevertheless, too much democratization may lead to less efficiency and 
effectiveness of intelligence.  A mandate that us very strict and proposes too much 
emphasis on the sensitive issue of freedom (civil liberties) may practically handcuff the 
intelligence agencies in their pursuit of security.  Similarly, a structure that is too open 
and transparent may expose the intelligence agencies to the same enemies they are 
supposed to counter.  The same can be said for excessive control which may hamper the 
abilities of the intelligence agencies to fulfill their roles and responsibilities.  Finally, a 
massive and careless recruitment of civilians with doubtful backgrounds, just for the sake 
of “civilianization” may compromise the ethos of intelligence and/or compromise its 
counter-intelligence functions. 
It is all a matter of degree and of balance, since too little democratization for the 




democracy.  A mandate that is too flexible, with a less transparent structure, less control 
and too much isolation of the intelligence might permit abuses against democratic values 
and norms (human rights and civil liberties) and even endanger the regime. 
Finally, the major challenge in deciphering the balance is efficiency. While 
effectiveness may be assessed internally or by the specialized parliamentary commissions 
or the executive body, efficiency is largely unknown and difficult to measure, which 
might be an incentive for future study and research.  Ideally, efficiency could be 
calculated according to the following formula, which is practically a classical cost–
benefit analysis: 
 
Input ~ Output 
where 
Input = finances + democratic intelligence process (respect of values/norms) + 
professionalization 
and 
Output = value of intelligence as product + implementation of mandate 
Figure 11.   Intelligence efficiency formula 
 
These variables could be defined as known, knowable and unknown.  Most 
budgets are transparent in terms of levels, but not programs, so they are known and/or 
knowable.  The intelligence process is the largest unknown in the formula, since little 
information is available on how intelligence agencies fulfill their mandate.  This is a very 
sensitive issue because this variable is supposed to be largely classified; otherwise it may 
compromise the intelligence cycle.  However, this secrecy may allow abuses or misuse of 
intelligence.  The output is mostly unknown to the public, since even major successes are 
supposed to stay hidden from the enemy.  Instead, the output is known or knowable to 
policy-makers, depending on their security clearances. 
B. THE FUTURE: IMPLICATIONS OF INTELLIGENCE REFORMS IN 
ROMANIA 
The current evolutions on the intelligence arena in Romania are crucial for the 
future of intelligence reforms, with respect to both democratization and  
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efficiency/effectiveness. The new National Security Strategy as well as the package of 
laws on national security will probably determine the degree of success of the security 
sector reform, in general, and intelligence, in particular. 
In line with the hypothesis of this thesis, intelligence reforms carried out thus far 
focused especially on the democratization of intelligence.  The mandate was clearly 
defined in legal texts approved by Parliament, according to democratic principles and 
values.  In terms of structure, the intelligence community was fragmented in order to 
prevent the appearance of a monopoly and to allow better control.  Control was tightened 
through the creation of a variety of mechanisms.  Finally, more and more civilians have 
been given access to the intelligence community.  All in all, the Romanian intelligence 
community is now closer than ever to Gill’s domestic intelligence bureau. 
All these steps, however, have led to a slight decrease in efficiency and 
effectiveness.  Presently, intelligence reforms in Romania are in the phase of the 
feedback loop, which would explain the current attempts to increase efficiency and 
effectiveness: the redefinition of roles and responsibilities, centralization of intelligence, 
and review of control mechanisms. 
Once again, equilibrium has to be taken into account for the future, as excessive 
emphasis on effectiveness and efficiency may lead to an undesirable drop in 
democratization levels.  As for the short-term, the following changes may be considered 
critical. 
1. Role 
The new laws will probably reflect the threat environment assessed by the 
National Security Strategy.  If the allegations regarding the prosecutorial attributes of the 
intelligence agencies are true, special attention has to be paid in defining the legal limits 
of this mandate. 
2. Structure 
The creation of the National Intelligence Community (CNI), if approved by 
Parliament, may finally lead to the creation of a true national intelligence community, 
with a central coordinator of intelligence analysis.  The CNI may also facilitate a better 
communication between the consumers of intelligence and the collectors/analysts. 
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3. Control 
The level of accountability seems adequate enough for the respect of democratic 
norms/values.  Most of the abuses signaled by the media (this by itself is a proof of good 
oversight) seem to be a result of the lack of professionalization of isolated individuals, 
and not of the intelligence system as a whole.  The only remaining issue in this field 
would be the oversight and control of the CNI by other state powers (legislative and 
judicial) as well as by the civil society. 
4. Professionalization 
This seems to be a problematic issue for the intelligence reform process.  Despite 
the recruitment of some civilians and the de-militarization of the main intelligence 
agencies, the intelligence community still seems to be relatively closed to outsiders.  The 
inclusion of political scientists and international relations specialists might provide the 
input that Romanian intelligence needs for a better self-definition as a profession, but this 
means the need for an effort to raise the interest of civilians to work for and with 
intelligence. 
In the more distant future, Romanian decision-makers should allow sufficient 
time for the current reforms to settle and produce the desired results.  An impulsive and 
sudden “reform of the reform” would only lead to the dangerous self-defeating repetitive 
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